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Key points 
Unemployment is one of the key economic issues in large parts of Europe – especially in the 
south, which has been in recession for the last 4-5 years. In countries like Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and Italy, youth unemployment rates have risen to levels that are often reported as 
“alarming” or “shocking” in the media. 
This  has prompted  European  institutions  into  a  flurry  of  activity.    The  Commission  has 
launched  a  number  of  initiatives  over  the  last  year  focused  predominantly  on  young 
unemployed  people.  A  further  string  of  new  measures  and  the  speeding  up  of  already 
agreed initiatives is expected to be the outcome of the European Council meeting on June 27-
28th.  Some  of  these  are  sensible  structural  measures  –  such  as  building  apprenticeship 
programmes and assisting in better school-to-work transitions – which are likely to have a 
positive  impact  on youth  unemployment  in  the  longer  term.    However,  most  others  are 
found wanting, or even counterproductive. 
This  Policy  Brief  argues  that  too  much  effort  and  political  capital  is  being  spent  by  the 
Commission and member states on being seen to be doing something quickly about youth 
unemployment when, in fact, the structural measures proposed will only have long-term 
effects.  Expectations  of  immediate  relief  are  running  well  above  what  can  be  delivered, 
especially at the EU level. Given the macroeconomic situation, no policy option will deliver a 
significant dent in either youth unemployment or unemployment in general. 
The EU policies on the table that are supposed to have an immediate effect, such as increased 
lending from the European Investment Bank to SMEs for the hiring of young people, will 
only have a very marginal impact on youth unemployment. Moreover, this impact will come 
mostly to the detriment of older unemployed persons excluded from such a scheme.  
Given  the  perceived  need  to  ‘be  seen  to  be  doing  something’,  we  fear  that  policies 
subsidising young workers de facto at the expense of older workers or, even worse, policies 
that subsidise older workers for not taking young people’s jobs, will proliferate. 2 | BARSLUND & GROS 
 
In fact, it is not at all clear that young people suffer more from being unemployed than older 
people, or even disproportionately more than older unemployed individuals. In particular, it 
is not clear that the much-publicised notion of a ‘lost generation’ with permanent ‘scars’ is 
relevant only to the young generation.  
We end by highlighting the much-neglected policy option of encouraging labour mobility 
within the internal market. Although the Commission is ‘upgrading and modernising’ its 
tools, much more could be done in this area – to the benefit of the individuals concerned, the 
member states, and European integration in general.  
The current unemployment situation1 
The  headline  conventional  youth  unemployment  numbers  that  are  widely  reported  do 
indeed paint a bleak picture of the current situation for youth. Spain and Greece are often 
portrayed  as  having  half  of  the  young  population  between  the  ages  of  15  and  24 
unemployed. But people familiar with labour market statistics know that the true picture is 
different,  because  most young  people  of  this  age  are  in  school  or  further  education  and 
therefore are not seeking work for good reason.  
‘Youth’ (un)employment data refer to those aged between 15 and 24. But this age group 
consists of two sub-groups with very different characteristics. ‘Teenagers’ (15 to 19 year-olds) 
should mostly still be in school; if not, they are likely to be very low skilled and thus would 
have difficulty finding a full-time job even in normal times. Fortunately, this group is rather 
small and has been declining in size over time (Gros, 2013). 
Unemployment among those aged between 20 and 24 should be more troubling. Members of 
this  cohort  who  are  seeking  full-time  employment  have  typically  completed  upper 
secondary  education,  but  have  decided  not  to  pursue  a  university  education  (or  have 
completed their university studies early). That is why one should look at the unemployment 
ratio – the percentage of the unemployed in the reference population – rather than at the 
unemployment rate (Figure 1). 
Indeed, this indicator paints a much less alarming picture than that created by the headline 
youth unemployment rate of more than 50% in Spain, or even the 66% recently reported in 
Greece. The youth unemployment rate in Greece does not mean that two-thirds of young 
Greeks youth are unemployed. Only 9% of Greek teenagers are labour-market participants; 
two-thirds of that number cannot find a job. The unemployment ratio among teenagers in 
Greece is thus less than 6%. But this statistic is not reported widely, probably because it is 
much less alarming. 
Moreover,  one  should  look  at  youth  unemployment  in  the  context  of  the  overall  labour 
market.  In  some  countries,  youth  unemployment  is  much  higher  relative  to  overall 
unemployment. Italy constitutes the most egregious case, with a youth unemployment rate 
over  three  times  higher  than  the  overall  unemployment  rate.  But  this  is  not  a  recent 
phenomenon – the situation was the same even before the outbreak of the crisis. By contrast, 
the  youth  unemployment  rate  in  Germany  is  ‘only’  1.5  times  higher  than  the  overall 
unemployment  rate  (Gros,  2013).  In  fact,  Figure  2  shows  that  for  most  countries,  youth 
unemployment has been rather stable relative to overall unemployment.  In this sense, the 
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current situation is not special; in all recessions, youth unemployment increases in many 
countries by twice as much as general unemployment. 
Figure 1. Unemployment ratios (ages 20-24), 2012 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Figure 2. Youth unemployment rates relative to total unemployment rates, 2012 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Finally, one must ask how much youth unemployment contributes to total unemployment. 
Looking at the problem in this way reveals a completely different picture from that usually 
presented.  In  those  countries  where  the  problem  makes  the  biggest  headlines  (the 
Eurozone’s south, with Greece and Spain supposedly the worst cases), youth unemployment 
accounts  for  less  than  a  quarter  of  overall  unemployment  (Figure  3).  By  contrast, youth 
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unemployment contributes relatively much more (about 40%) to overall unemployment in 
countries like Sweden and the UK. One could argue that the latter two should worry more 
about their youth unemployment than Spain or Greece. 
Figure 3. Youth unemployment as percentage of total unemployment, 2013q1 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Unemployment is one of the most significant risks that individuals and households face, and 
because of the current macroeconomic situation, unemployment is much higher than normal 
in many parts of Europe. This is the situation for all age groups and it does not warrant age-
specific  policies  which,  given  weak  overall  demand,  will  to  a  large  extent  only  shift 
employment around among age groups. Such policies are only relevant if one is confident 
that certain age groups suffer more from unemployment than others.   
Which generations are ‘lost’? Is unemployment worse for the young? 
The  fear  of  permanent  scarring  of  young  jobless  people  –  turning  them  into  a  ‘lost 
generation’  –  is  one  of  the  most  persuasive  arguments  in  favour  of  promoting  policy 
measures that target youth unemployment specifically. If the first labour market experience 
is crucial for subsequent labour market participation and earnings, there might be a case for 
policies promoting youth employment at the expense of employment of other age groups. 
This could be the case if, for example, the period immediately after graduation is formative 
for the rest of one’s career. 
The  Commission  is  increasingly  mentioning  scarring  and  the  fear  of  a  ‘lost  generation’ 
together with the youth unemployment situation as an argument in its communications. 
The notion of ‘scars’ from unemployment comes from a large body of academic literature 
that  looks  into  the  short-  and  long-term  effects  of  unemployment  spells  on  subsequent 
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labour market outcomes, in particular, on labour market participation rates and earnings.2 
The main question this literature seeks to address is the counterfactual of what would, on 
average, have happened with subsequent earnings and labour market participation had a 
given individual not been unemployed for some period at an earlier stage.3 
The key point of relevance for public policy in the current situation is to what extent scarring 
is  worse  for  younger  than  older  cohorts,  i.e.  the  relative  effect  rather  than  the  precise 
magnitude. Unfortunately, much of the literature on this issue does not look at the effect for 
different cohorts, but rather only at the impact on one cohort (which, in the majority of cases, 
is a young one).  
The predominant view in the literature is that unemployment has negative long-term effects 
and, when this is investigated as part of the research question, the effects are worse for older 
(prime age) cohorts. In their review of studies based mostly on US data, Couch and Placzek 
(2010) only find articles where scarring increases with age and none where the opposite is 
the case (when this is investigated together). Barslund (2013) also reviews studies based on 
European data and reaches the same conclusion.   
In general, the scaring effect varies greatly from study to study. The US survey includes one 
study where scarring leads to a wage penalty of 8-13% after six years (with higher initial 
wage drops); other studies show larger scarring effects and a few show no permanent scars 
at all, since the initial effect on wages disappears after six years. Generally, results span the 
range from no long-term effect to wage penalties of up to 30-40% six years (or longer) after 
being unemployed. 4 
But Barslund (2013) also finds that scarring effects tend to be much smaller for studies of 
continental European countries compared to the US and the UK.  This suggests that the US 
experience does not translate exactly to Europe.  
There are two important qualifiers to note in relation to the findings in the literature. The 
first is that the average impact of scarring is likely to be smaller than that which can be 
inferred from published studies. This is due to publication bias – it is very difficult to get a 
study published which does not find a scarring effect, thus it is likely that studies that failed 
to find scarring stayed in the drawer. Second, the credibility of the studies depends on how 
well they can estimate the right counterfactual. Even if a study is carefully done using state 
of the art statistical methods, it can be very difficult to judge if a convincing counterfactual 
has been estimated. 
 
                                                   
2 The term ‘scarring’ or ‘scars’ from unemployment goes back to at least Ellwood (1982). 
3 This is no easy question to approach, because those unemployed at any given point in time are likely 
to differ from those employed in many observable and unobservable ways. To appreciate this, take as 
an example two persons who differ in their earnings today and where one was unemployed five years 
ago. This difference could be due to the disadvantage one got from being unemployed, but it could 
just as well be that he or she was unemployed because he or she – by way of character – was less 
motivated to find a job. However, the same motivational difference might also explain the differences 
in earnings today. Thus, the two persons would have had the same earnings difference today if some 
public policy had put the less motivated one into a job five years earlier and she or he would have 
avoided the unemployment spell. 
4 It is important to keep in mind that our argument relies on the fact that younger workers do not 
seem to be harder hit by unemployment compared to older workers.  6 | BARSLUND & GROS 
 
Our reading of the literature suggests that the loss of firm-specific capital (of which older 
workers have more than younger workers) is important to understand the magnitude of the 
scarring effect. Another important characteristic could be that of mobility. Older workers 
will more often have stronger attachments to their local area via their family relations, such 
as children’s schooling and spouse’s employment. Younger workers, on the other hand, are 
on average likely to be more mobile and have smaller fixed costs from moving for a new job. 
In sum, the evidence suggests that unemployment spells indeed have long-term negative 
effects on labour market outcomes; however, there is little evidence to back the claim that 
young people are more vulnerable to those effects than are other age groups. Thus, ‘scarred 
generations’  might  be  a  more  accurate  term  to  use.  This  severely  weakens  the  case  for 
measures  aimed  particularly  at  jobless  youth  as  opposed  to  more  general  measures 
benefiting all age groups.  
Furthermore, young people rarely have the same amount of family responsibilities (towards 
offspring or parents), but instead are often able to rely on their family for backup.  
Against this background, the focus on ‘solving youth unemployment’ is misguided. While 
there  is  no  doubt  that  the  current  unemployment  situation  is  causing  a  lot  of  hardship 
around Europe, it is hardly a solution to shift this hardship from young to older cohorts. 
Current policy initiatives without short-term effects, or only shifting the burden  
The  Commission  has  been  increasingly  active  in  presenting  initiatives  to  combat  youth 
unemployment. Last December saw the Youth Employment Package, and this March the 
Youth Employment Initiative was unveiled. Some of the elements of these packages have 
been agreed upon, while others are grinding their way through the system and are waiting 
for financing to come through in the next budget cycle.  
Those initiatives which aim at structural improvement are to be applauded. Strengthening 
vocational and educational training systems – the Commission’s call for member states to 
“modernise and improve their education systems” in order to reduce skill mismatches and 
address the problem of early school leaving (European Commission, 2013) – always makes 
sense. The Commission is very well placed to advance mutual learning on these topics via 
the open method of coordination, and it should certainly takes this up as part of its core 
work programme. However, the Commission should spell out that such structural initiatives 
will not deliver immediate results. Indeed, some of these are practically irrelevant to the 
unemployed young population of today.  
The Youth Guarantee – the poster child for efforts so far – was proposed as part of the Youth 
Employment Package in 2012 and was adopted by member states. It guarantees unemployed 
youth (up to the age of 25) access to employment, education or high-quality traineeships 
within  four  months  of  becoming  unemployed.  The  European  Social  Funds  will  provide 
funding for this (starting from early 2014), with additional funding coming from the Youth 
Unemployment initiative (also to be made available in 2014). At this stage, the details of 
implementation, which will naturally vary from country to country, are unclear, but that it 
will  impose  an  immense  administrative  burden  in  areas  affected  by  high  youth 
unemployment  is  certain.  At  the  same  time,  the  Commission  recognises  that  there  are 
already problems in general with the quality of traineeships. With many young coming out 
of education and work scarce, it is difficult to see this being implemented and having an UNEMPLOYMENT IS THE SCOURGE, NOT YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT PER SE | 7 
 
impact in practice. In addition, with the Youth Employment Initiative’s focus on areas with 
high rates of unemployment, there is a fear that the Youth Guarantee will help subsidise 
work that is by no means sustainable in the longer term. There is also the risk that it may 
help to replace genuine employment of older or younger workers. 
All this will further stretch overburdened public employment services, adding an extra layer 
of rules governing the unemployed, and dividing the services offered along age groups.  
More  recently, plans  have  been  aired  which  would  facilitate  lending  from  the  European 
Investment Bank to SMEs in a way that would “incentivise the hiring of young people” 
(European Commission, 2013). While the immediate effect on youth unemployment of such 
a  proposal  would  depend  on  the  amount  of  funding  made  available  and  the  exact 
implementation  mechanism,  it  is  unlikely  to  have  a  large  impact  because  of  the  lack  of 
aggregate demand in areas affected by high youth unemployment. Subsidising youth entry 
into  the  labour  market  can  be  justified  if  there  is  a  structural  mismatch  between  the 
minimum wage (whether statutory of effectively negotiated) and the productivity of young 
people  which  prevents  them  from  becoming  employed.  However,  this  should  not  be 
addressed  by  a  temporary  facility  that  is  aimed  chiefly  at  SMEs,  and  should  ideally  be 
tailored to a skill set (i.e. low-skilled workers) rather than depending on age. Again, there is 
a substantial risk that this will crowd out genuine jobs of older workers and simply shift the 
burden of unemployment. 
One of the biggest risks of the focus on youth unemployment, and the need to be seen to be 
doing something about it when there is not much that can be done, is that various temporary 
specialised subsidisation schemes will proliferate. These are costly, difficult to administer, 
create undesirable division between age groups and have little long-term rationale.    
Labour mobility – promoting the internal market 
While unemployment is high in southern Europe and the short-term macroeconomic outlook 
is poor, the opposite is currently the case in Germany. Unemployment is at its lowest level 
for  decades  and  there  are  reports  of  labour  shortages  at  the  regional  level  in  some 
occupations.  Furthermore,  Germany  is  expected  to  grow  at  a  fast  enough  pace  next 
year that further  jobs  will  be  added.  This,  combined  with  the  demographic  outlook  for 
Germany where large cohorts are about to retire, offers a unique opportunity for mobile 
labour to seek opportunities in the north.  
The German labour market is large and the national labour force will shrink considerably in 
the next ten years. That the potential exists for labour mobility is evidenced by the large 
numbers  of  Polish  and  Romanian  people  who  have  arrived  in  Germany  in  recent  years 
(Figure 4). The influx of people from Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece, on the other hand, is 
meagre in comparison; although this has grown considerably relative to the preceding two 
years, it was from a very low base (Table 1).   
 8 | BARSLUND & GROS 
 
Figure 4. Youth immigration flows to Germany (aged 18-25) 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Table 1. Recent immigration to Germany (all age groups) 
  Average 
2005-2009 
2010  2011  2012  Difference: Average 
2005-2009 and 2012 
Change 2011/12 
Greece  8,400  12,500  23,800  34,100  25,700   10,300 (↑43%) 
Italy  19,000  24,500  30,200  42,200  23,200   12,000 (↑40%) 
Spain  9,200  13,600  20,700  29,900  20,700   9,200 (↑45%) 
Portugal  5,500  6,400  8,200  11,800  6,300   3,600 (↑43%) 
Note: Figures represent immigration flows of non-Germans from partner countries. 
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik Deutschland, 2013. 
 
Both the federal and regional governments, together with German employers’ organisations, 
are now trying to tap into the workforce potential in southern Europe (Barslund and Busse, 
2013). 
The  Commission’s  approach  to  fostering  this mobility  has  been  too  cautions.  Stating  the 
obvious  that  the  decision  to  move  “remains  a  personal  decision  for  the  individual 
concerned”,  it  has  chosen  to  promote  its  online  tool  for  facilitating  the  matching  of 
employers with employees, the EURES platform. EURES is the main tool available to the 
Commission and it therefore seems reasonable to “upgrade and modernise it” as set out in 
late 2012. However, it is lacking in ambition – exemplified by the fact that EURES apparently 
results in only 50,000 placements a year – and upgrade work will only begin in 2014.  
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Related to the EURES platform is the ‘Your first EURES job’ initiative (springing from the 
Youth  Opportunities  Initiative),  which  currently  involves  four  countries:  Denmark, 
Germany, Spain, and Italy. For employees, it provides support for matching and funds for 
interview  trips  and  moving  costs,  while  on  the  employer  side  there  is  support  for 
recruitment and training costs. The scheme is limited to 18-30 year-olds. The initiative is 
currently being piloted and the target for 2012-13 is 5,000 placements. It is fair to say that it 
will not make a big impact.  
The Commission’s lack of ambition in this area is puzzling, since labour mobility and the 
internal  labour  market  should  be  one  of  its  children.  The  current  situation  calls  for  the 
Commission  to  use  its  considerable  strength  and  know-how  in  bringing  partners  and 
stakeholders  together  to  facilitate  the  necessary  infrastructure  to  allow  better  matching 
across borders of workers and employers – over and above what is being done as part of 
EURES. The proposed revival of the Youth Employment Action Teams, which will be active 
in areas with very high youth unemployment, should be matched with selected employer 
organisations to explore mutual opportunities. 
The question is then: where does this leave the sending countries? First, it has to be pointed 
out that individuals who find a job abroad are better off personally. Second, by moving they 
relieve  the  immediate  strain  on  public  resources  in  sending  countries  due  to savings  on 
health  care  expenditures,  unemployment  benefits  and  other  social  expenditures,  and  to 
reduced strain on retraining and educational facilities. There might also be a non-negligible 
value  from  an  increased  stream  of  remittances.  Further  down  the  road  when  southern 
economies pick up speed again, most are likely to come back – and they will have skills and 
experience, thereby contributing beyond what would have been possible had they stayed in 
the first place.  
Conclusions 
This Policy Brief carries four main messages.  
First,  the  relationship  between  overall  unemployment  and  that  of  youth  is  by  no means 
special to this recession and the total number of youth unemployed is much smaller than 
generally assumed.  
Second, the notion of a lost generation is misconceived. The empirical literature shows that 
there might indeed by a ‘scarring’ effect in the sense that a prolonged spell of unemployment 
leads  to  lower  earnings  later,  but  it  applies  across  all  cohorts.  If  there  is  any  difference 
between youth and the others, it is that older workers are likely to suffer more.  
The  third  message  is  that  there  really  is  no  case  for  a  specific  focus  on  ‘solving  youth 
unemployment’. The proposals being churned out by the European institutions are likely to 
have little short-term impact and to the extent that they do, the impact might be detrimental 
to  other  cohorts.  We  fear  that  the  need  to  be  seen  to  ‘be  doing  something  about  youth 
unemployment’ will allow ever more expensive schemes to proliferate that will subsidise the 
employment of young workers at the expense of others, resulting in ever more distorted 
labour markets. 
The final message is that encouraging labour mobility remains the one policy option which 
has some promise in the current situation of lopsided European labour markets, but it is 
approached  too  cautiously  by  the Commission. More should  be  done  to  facilitate  labour 
mobility.    10 | BARSLUND & GROS 
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•  Maintain the highest standards of academic excellence and unqualified independence  
•  Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process, and 
•  Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations, 
Assets 
•  Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable analysts, 
•  Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research expertise 
and to extend its outreach,  
•  An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals. 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Social Welfare Policies 
Financial Institutions and Markets 
Energy and Climate Change 
EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policy 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Politics and Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Agricultural and Rural Policy 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
 